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The enlargement of the EU from 15 to 27 member states has the potential to 
affect the whole direction and shape of EU policy with regard to development - 
both because of different priorities of the new Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) states and the issue of aid diversion to new and poorer states.  This 
paper examines whether the CEE states have a fundamentally different 
approach to development and developing countries and whether this will lead 
to pressure to shift the policy in new directions over the longer term. In 
particular the paper explores the following questions: 
• has enlargement altered the geographical focus of EU development 
policy?  
• has enlargement altered strategic focus of EU development policy?  
• What has been the impact of the CEE states on the precepts of 
coordination, complementarity and coherence (3cs) in the EU's 
development co-operation policies and operations?    
• How has the Commission responded to new challenges, in particular 
how have the different Directorate Generals of the European 
Commission (Development & External Relations) integrated the views 
of the CEE states into development policy?  
Finally the paper will consider possible future directions for EU Development 
policy, given increasing influence by the new member states. 
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The enlargement of the EU from 15 to 27 member states affected broad 
swathes of EU policy. One area of particular interest is the impact 
enlargement has had on EU development policy. Each enlargement of the EU 
has influenced the geographical focus of EU development policy. Never 
before has an enlargement of the EU included so many former recipients of 
EU financial assistance. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
2002 the EU committed itself to substantial increases in Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA), which would cement the EU’s position as the 
world’s biggest donor of development aid. Yet only two years later ten 
countries who had previously been recipients of EU development assistance 
via PHARE were to sign up to this commitment. This raised some important 
questions such as what is the impact of this enlargement on the goals and 
strategic focus of EU development policy? Overall, it is vital to evaluate to 
what extent the CEE countries have been able to undertake the mental 
reorientation from a “receiver country” to a “donor country” (Rehbichler, 2006), 
something this paper aims to examine by focusing on the 2004 enlargement, 
although the accession of both Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 will also be 
considered.  
 
Background 
 
The CEE states have a long history of engagement with the developing world. 
They contributed to development cooperation via the aid programme of 
COMECOM. However, much of that aid was characterized by a ‘strong and 
strategic orientation, concentrating on political allies and friendly countries 
which were pursuing socialist goals’ (Carbone, 2004, p. 244). As a result it is 
argued that ‘these countries have no great tradition of development aid and 
no development cooperation policy in the modern sense’ (in Michaux, 2002). 
The end of the cold war saw the majority of these states cut whatever aid 
programmes they had in operation. However, at the same time relations 
between the EU and CEE states had gone from ‘minimal’ to creating the 
environment to full membership (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 139-40). To 
help them reform their economies, the CEE countries were given financial 
assistance by the EU. Via the PHARE programmes, the EU provided financial 
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and non-financial resources to prepare them for eventual EU membership 
(Babarinde and Faber, 2004, 31). Therefore even as late as 1999 Poland was 
the third largest recipient of EU aid worth Euro 305 million. 
 
CEE states were in the ‘unique situation of being recipients of aid from the EU 
while simultaneously preparing to become donors’ (Carbone, 2004, p. 245). 
This unique situation prompted much speculation that the 2004 enlargement 
would impact on existing arrangements for EU development cooperation. The 
end of the cold war had already seen the EU re-define ‘its relationship with its 
CEE neighbours’ with associated financial benefits for these countries and a 
resulting drop in aid to ACP countries (Babarinde and Faber, 2004, 31). This 
fear was compounded by the ‘scant attention’ paid to development 
cooperation policy during the accession, which was seen as an indicator of 
low political priority (Grimm and Harder, 2005, p. 11). Despite this there were 
no ‘opt-outs’ for new Members, which meant that on becoming EU members 
all CEE states would have to adhere to all aspects of the development acquis, 
including the Cotonou Agreement, and in particular contribute to the European 
Development Fund (EDF) (Hewitt and Whiteman, 2004, p. 146). This means 
all the provisions that date from the Treaty of Maastricht, which gave a legal 
basis to development policy via Articles 177-181a. Alongside these legal 
commitments the NMS were also committed to ‘accept the overall objectives 
of EU aid: sustainable economic and social development, smooth and gradual 
integration of developing countries into the world economy, poverty reduction, 
and development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law’ (CEC, 
2002). Despite this situation, it is argued that some new Member States’ 
governments apparently were not clear about the Union’s expectations 
regarding development policy (Grimm and Harmer, 2005). Indeed some 
NGOs alleged that development was treated as the 32nd chapter2 of the 
accession process.   
 
In the run up to accession DG Development highlighted the following 
characteristics of the NMS aid policies. It was found that there was a low 
                                                 
2 The relevance of this is that 31 chapters were negotiated.  
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governmental commitment and lack of a significant constituency for 
development cooperation, the thematic focus did not prioritise poverty 
reduction, there was a lack of funds for ODA and development policy-making 
lacked broad based participation (in Morgera and Marin Duran, 2004, p. 161). 
These can be summarised as producing three particular challenges:  
• The quantity of aid 
• The quality of aid 
• The geographical focus and scope of aid 
(Carbone, 2004, p. 248-51).  
The next sections examine these three challenges in turn to assess the 
impact of enlargement three years on.  
 
Quantity of Aid 
Whilst many CEE states like to see themselves as ‘re-emerging donors’ 
(Grimm and Harmer, 2005) and most had national development programmes 
in place by the time they joined in 2004, the percentage of their ODA was 
nowhere near the target set at the Barcelona Summit of 2002 of 0.7% by 
present EU target of 0.7%  (Press, 2003). As a result the NMS were given a 
differentiated target: that of increasing their ODA to 0.17% GDP by 2010 and 
0.33% of GDP by 2015. This differentiated target is unsurprising when we 
consider the fact that all of the new member states are still eligible for World 
Bank borrowing (Granell, 2005, p. 11).  
 
NGOs have been critical of some of the measures used to calculate ODA. 
4.86% of the general contributions by NMS to the EU budget are counted as 
ODA (Rehbichler, 2006). The 4.86% contribution meant that EU membership 
led to an increase in ODA expenditure in the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and 
Poland to 0.12-0.14% of GNI. Thus they are no longer really far behind some 
of the less generous “old” members such as Italy (0.15% in 2004) and Austria 
(0.23% in 2004). However, other NMS such as the Baltic States are greatly 
challenged when it comes to the task of increasing their ODA’ (Rehbichler, 
2006). Having said all this it is clear that the additional members will bring 
additional funds to the EU’s development budget.  
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 Debt cancellation has also been counted as aid, helping to improve the 
figures for many countries (Hayes, 2007). In 2004 Concord called for 
increased transparency in how the ODA figures were calculated. For example, 
the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic all cancelled 
significant debts to Iraq, some of which may have been included in their aid 
figures for 2006 (Hayes, 2007, p. 9). Although official figures are yet to be 
published for Bulgaria, NGOs are concerned that the government will use 
debt cancellation in Iraq to inflate their ODA figures. As several Bulgarian civil 
society groups have argued: ‘This would con the Bulgarian people into 
thinking that more money is being made available for aid than is really the 
case’ (in Hayes, 2007, p. 42). There are also worrying signs that some 
countries are not progressing towards their 2010 target. For example, the 
Slovak Republic’s aid fell by more than 9% and Latvia’s by 1% in 2006 
(Hayes, 2007). In saying that, the same report also points out that the worst 
culprits for inflating their aid figures are the French and the Austrian 
governments, with more than half of their ODA consisting of non-aid items” 
(Hayes, 2007, p.3). It can therefore be argued that old member states with in 
many cases long histories of development cooperation are setting a bad 
example to these new donors.  
 
A survey of in-country NGOs in 2007 found a high level of scepticism about 
the ability of their countries to meet the EU target of 0.17% of GNI in 2010 
without inflating its aid. Of all the 2004 accessions states, only Lithuania was 
judged ‘likely’ to meet this target. Six others were seen as unlikely to meet the 
target, whilst Latvia, due to its decision to raise its ODA budget to only 0.1% 
of GNI instead of the anticipated 0.17% by 2010 was unsurprisingly judged as 
not being able to meet the target. However, these targets also ensure the EU 
kept its commitments made at Monterrey (see CEC, 2007).  
 
On accession it was agreed that the new member states would not be 
expected to contribute to EDF 9 as the pool of resources and the budget had 
already been set (UNDP, 2005). However, they are expected to contribute to 
the fund for 2008-13. As a result Babarinde and Faber argued that ‘it is 
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unlikely that given the magnitude of their own economic problems, the 
acceding CEE countries, upon accession, would enthusiastically support, for 
example, a considerable increase in EDF 10’ (p. 32). Research has tended to 
support this claim (UNDP, 2005; Francesca 2007) as has the reality, although 
the final details of EDF 10 are still to be finalised.  
 
Quality of Aid 
There was a concern that the lack of expertise amongst the NMS would 
further complicate efforts to reform the effectiveness of EU aid. There was 
also a concern that some of the acceding states might hamper efforts to untie 
aid (DG Development, 2002). Development NGOs have been highly critical of 
the practice where governments tie aid by making such aid conditional on the 
receiving countries buying goods and services from the donor country. 
Despite the fact that the EU has moved towards the untying of aid and that 
the practice is contrary to OECD recommendations NMS have adopted the 
practice. One response is that it helps economic development in the donor 
country. For example, the Hungarian government evaluates its tied aid 
initiatives very positively in 2005, particularly from the perspective of 
Hungarian economic interests (Hayes, 2007). Another similar response is that 
tied aid helps build capacity and public understanding in the donor country. 
For example, the Latvian government justifies the fact that the majority of 
Latvian aid is highly tied ‘on the basis that that Latvia is a newcomer in the 
field of development co-operation, and needs to build its own capacity and 
public understanding and support for development co-operation before 
proceeding to an open aid market’ (in Hayes, 2007, p.36).  
 
There is also concern that whilst on paper all NMS are oriented toward 
international “best practice”, with its emphasis on strengthening the general 
capacities of developing countries through knowledge transfer, good 
governance etc, rather than technical aid, there is also a strong lobby in the 
NMS to use ODA for export subsidies and infrastructure projects most 
Western donors will no longer support (Rehbichler, 2006). DG Development 
argues that the NMS might not be so familiar with concepts such as donor 
practices’ harmonisation, selectivity and performance-based allocations, the 
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PRSP (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers) approach and the shift away from 
projects to sector/budget support (DG Development, 2002). It has been clear 
that some of the EU-10 have started to implement the DAC Recommendation 
on untying aid to Least Developed Countries (LDCs), with the Commission 
threat to pursue any breaches of EC internal market rules on ODA a major 
incentive (CEC, 2007).  
 
Geographical focus and scope of aid 
Grilli argued in 1993 that ‘the only recognisable constant in the maze of 
changing regional ties developed by the Community was the preservation of 
the relative primacy of the associated African….countries among those 
receiving concessions’ (Grilli, 1993, p. 338). This focus on Africa could 
therefore be affected by enlargement, as each previous enlargement had 
altered the geographical focus of EU action (see Van Reisen, 2007, p. 50). 
The 1973 enlargement brought the former British colonies into the fold, whilst 
the 1986 enlargement to Spain and Portugal shifted focus to Latin America. 
The influence of the 1986 enlargement could be seen by the 68 % increase in 
aid to Latin America in the first half of the 1990s. However, this must be seen 
in the context of the EU’s overall aid budget. As a percentage of the overall 
budget the share dropped due to an increasing focus on CEEs (Holland, 
2002, p. 81). 
 
The 2004 enlargement prompted fears that the ACP states position at the 
peak of a ‘pyramid of privilege’ could be threatened (see Dauderstadt, 2002, 
p. 11). CEE states have limited historical connections to ACP states and of 
the new states only Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic can be said to 
have a foreign policy reach outside of Europe. Interestingly Poland has 
identified Angola and Tanzania as priority ODA states from 2007 (Baginski, 
2007) - both states historically part of the “socialist brotherhood”. This lead to 
fears amongst some ACP states that CEE states would ally themselves with 
countries such as Germany and the Netherlands that prefer a more globally 
orientated policy (Arts and Dickinson, 2004, p. 5). As Rehbichler argues ‘for 
many governments and NGOs in the NMS, the focus of EU development 
policy on poverty reduction and the LDCs, such as in Africa, is difficult to fully 
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comprehend’ (Rehbichler, 2006). Evidence to date does suggest that despite 
some wrangles, the European Development Fund is safe. However, the 2002 
Commission report points out that the share of EC ODA to the least 
developed countries in total ODA has been declining over the last 40 years 
although absolute volumes have increased’ and that ‘the situation in new 
Member States will merely reinforce these trends’ (CEC, 2002, p. 14). 
According to one report ‘these trends are unlikely to change much after 
enlargement as they are consistent with the development policies pursued by 
new Member States and broadly reflect public opinion trends’ (UNDP, 2005).  
 
However, eastern enlargement has consolidated on-budget external actions in 
neighbourhood and pre-accession countries; the so-called ring of friends of 
Eastern and Southern neighbours. As Poul Nielson observed in April 2003: ‘I 
would find it natural for you to argue in favour of stability in the Balkans, the 
Caucasus and in the Central Asian Republics. You bring history and 
experience to those relations, and I look forward to your contribution’ (in 
Maxwell & Engel, 2003). This is unsurprising due to the geopolitical 
importance of the eastern border. Second, there were issues of national self-
interest. For the majority of Central European states, strategic and security 
interests, particularly related to the eastern European region, are key 
concerns in foreign policy. As Bretherton and Vogler argue ‘security is the first 
condition for development’ (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 114). Aid, and 
particularly humanitarian aid, is considered an important policy instrument in 
maintaining regional stability, including containing migration from the east and 
reducing the impact of conflict (Olsen, 2005, p. 594). In addition, aid 
programmes were developed to support the ambition and sense of national 
pride involved in the transition to the ‘West’, and the shift from being aid 
recipients to being donor governments (Grimm and Harmer, 2005). Since 
accession several of the CEEs have sought to develop the Neighbourhood 
Policy further, including extending it to the Caucuses (Edwards, 2006, p. 157).  
 
As mentioned earlier in this article in relation to the inflation of aid figures, it is 
worth bearing in mind that the problem of a national development policy 
undermined or even dictated by security and trade interests is not an issue 
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that only applies to CEE states. The EU 15 have a long history of 
development cooperation policy driven by strategic, economic and security 
interests. An example is European development policy, and particularly 
democracy promotion, in Algeria. The relationship with Algeria, which is 
embedded in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, has been repeatedly 
criticised for being primarily based on European concerns about political 
instability and subsequent migration from North Africa lacking any special 
attention to democracy or development (Olsen, 2002). In this case, the 
containment of political Islam and concerns as to  immigration from Algeria to 
the EU have limited the scope of EU action and have led to the pursuit of 
security at the expense of development assistance (Güney and Çelenk, 2007, 
p.126). 
 
This is supported in a BOND report that highlights that the majority of aid in 
CEE states goes to near neighbours i.e 95% of Slovenia aid goes to former 
Yugoslavia and the remaining 5% to Albania (Press, 2003). An added issue is 
the support given by both Poland and Hungary to their Diasporas in the CIS 
and the Balkan region (Rehbichler, 2006). It is also reflected in Commission 
thinking: ‘The European Neighbourhood Policy builds a privileged partnership 
relationship with neighbouring countries, bringing them closer to the Union 
and offering them a stake in the EU’s internal market in parallel with support 
for dialogue and reform. Development policy considerations are inscribed 
within the broader policy framework established by the neighbourhood policy’ 
(CEC, 2005a, p. 16).  
 
What has been the impact of the CEE states on the precepts of coordination, 
complementarity and coherence (3cs) in the EU's development co-operation 
policies and operations? Has enlargement altered strategic focus of EU 
development policy? DG Development argued that the NMS should be 
familiar with core concepts and current debates that the European 
Commission takes for granted: ensuring policy coherence between national 
and EU measures; measuring and monitoring results at different levels; the 
balance between conditionality and ownership (DG Development, 2002, p. 4).  
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However, as it is stated in other parts of this work the subject was not given 
special attention during accession negotiations and some NGOs alleged that 
development was treated as the 32nd chapter of the accession process. So 
while the DG Development has demanded the NMS be familiar with the 
complex EU development cooperation policies, it is unclear what exactly has 
been done to guarantee this during the accession period and thereafter.  
 
It has been clear that since joining the EU the new Member States have been 
very public in their support for the current objectives and instruments of the 
EU's development policy. Evidence appears to suggest that all Member 
States are committed to the European Consensus on Development (2005) 
which makes clear that the primary objective of European aid is eradicating 
poverty; the poorest countries should get priority; developing countries should 
"own" the development process; the EU should increase and harmonise its 
aid; and the EU's wider policies should support development” (CEC, 2005b). 
However, there is a fear that the New Member States have different 
approaches to development from the EU-15. NGOs were fearful that the NMS 
would orientate the EU away from its focus of poverty reduction (see Concord 
Working Group). CONCORD claimed in 2004 that just three NMS (Estonia, 
Malta and Poland) listed poverty reduction as an objective for their ODA. In 
most NMS higher priority was being assigned to issues like promotion of 
democracy and the rule of law (seven countries), regional security and 
sustainable development (six countries each) (CONCORD, 2004).  
 
However, enlargement to CEE has exaggerated the rightward trend within the 
EU and the EP (Orbie, 2003, p. 413). This has put pressure on programmes 
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that promote reproductive rights. As Bretherton shows the whole question of 
gender equality is a low priority among CEE governments (Bretherton, 2006, 
p. 101). Reproductive rights for women is a controversial one in most CEE 
states, especially those with a strong Catholic tradition. Whilst CEE states 
have signed up to the acquis on gender mainstreaming, some NGOs and 
Commission officials fear that these states will use the implementation 
dimension to challenge the aspects of EU policy they disagree with. For 
example, the May 2007 Gender and Development paper includes a section on 
reproductive rights, which the CEE states have agreed to in principle. It has 
been alleged that some officials in CEE states believe that they might have 
‘lost the political battle but they will win the practical battle’. Again the lack of 
interest in this dimension is not found solely in the NMS with the DAC Peer 
Review highlighting that the principles of gender mainstreaming do not seem 
to be applied consistently in programme implementation or highlighted as an 
important indicator when measuring programme performance (OECD, 2007, 
p. 41).  
 
Developments and Influences 
 
Changing Attitudes to aid in CEE? 
As a report stated in 2003 ‘Government commitment to development 
cooperation in the countries we visited is in general rather low, reflecting in 
part the lack of a significant constituency for development cooperation, as 
development NGOs are few and far between and the public supports mainly 
humanitarian aid to neighbouring countries’ (Development Strategies/IDC, 
2003).  Within the EU there appears to be a reluctance to open up a debate 
about aid to the south especially as many of the citizens of these new 
Member States are still struggling to cope with poverty and economic change. 
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A special Eurobarometer on development aid supports this low priority, finding 
that eight of the ten new Member States rank at the lower end of the “yes” 
scale in that they believe that their Government helps poor people in 
developing countries (EB, 2004). There is also a significant difference in 
opinion between the EU-15 group (55%) and the new Member States (32%) 
whereby the latter group are considerably more sceptical about the 
effectiveness of development aid provided by their governments. There is a 
significant level of scepticism in many of the new Member States notably in 
Latvia (52%), the Czech Republic (49%), Poland (46%), Estonia (45%) and 
Slovakia (44%) where a high proportion of “no” responses are observed (EB, 
2004, p. 43).  
 
However, within many NMS there is a driver that leads to ODA. This driver is 
more philosophically based, particularly the principle of solidarity and identity 
with vulnerable populations, a moral (and Christian) obligation to give 
charitably and support others less advantaged than oneself. These drivers are 
underscored by Central Europe’s own experience with political and economic 
transformation in the early 1990s, and a desire to export this expertise in 
transition to other countries (Grimm & Harmer, 2005). The NMS from Central 
and Eastern Europe can be expected to back quite vigorously the EU’s 
promotion of democracy and human rights – because of their historical 
experiences of authoritarianism (Smith, 2004, p. 75). One area where NMS 
see themselves playing a crucial role is in EU efforts to promote democracy. 
This is clearly linked to the role the EU played in stabilising the fledgling 
democracies in the CEE countries, which is seen to be one of the main 
success stories for EU.   
 
The Need for Education 
There is a clear link between public education and levels of aid donorship. 
‘Only a few of the NMS (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia and Hungary) 
have created structures for raising awareness on development policy themes, 
although all countries recognise the importance of development education. 
The EU Commission’s recent commitment to provide € 10 million in additional 
funds from the 2006 budget for internal development education in the NMS 
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and candidate countries in 2007 gives some reason to hope that this 
recognition will lead to deeds in the future’ (Rehbichler, 2006). 
 
The need for education was borne out in a special Eurobarometer that was 
carried out to discover whether attitudes to aid in CEE countries differed from 
those in the EU-15. It found a noticeable disparity between the views of the 
EU-15 group and those of the NMS. It found that in some of the new Member 
States (Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Latvia and Slovakia), 
respondents were more reluctant to take a strong stance on the question that 
it is important to help people in poor countries, with relatively lower 
proportions responding “very important”, although the overall proportion 
believing that this is important remains very high (EB, 2004, p. 26). 
Eurobarometer concludes that there appears to be a lack of knowledge in 
many NMS. When asked if the amount their government dedicated to aid was 
right, the result was a relatively high proportion of respondents who are 
unable to give an answer. Notably high “don’t know” rates were observed in 
Estonia (56%), Latvia (49%), Lithuania (45%) and Hungary (44%) (EB, 2004, 
p. 37). However, what might change is that CEE states could use the EU to 
sell ODA to a population without much recent experience in the area. For 
example, all the NMS automatically joined the Cotonou Agreement upon 
accession to the EU and this could be used as a vehicle for raising public 
awareness or countering scepticism - a big issues as many in the NMS 
appear to have a greater inclination to trust the United States for helping 
Africa to develop than the EU (NMS-10: 50% versus EU-15: 27%) (EB, 2004).  
 
Lack of Political Will and Expertise 
The UNDP report in 2005 argued that ODA figures were limited in many new 
members due, in part, to insufficient political will (UNDP, 2005). This lack of 
political will is clearly linked to limited public support but also to their relative 
lack of expertise or capacity in the area of development cooperation. As 
Adanja argues most were novices in the field of international development 
cooperation (Adanja, 2007). Yet despite this, and despite the fact that the 
development acquis is an important part of the Treaty, the subject was not 
given special attention during accession negotiations. As Baginski argues 
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neither the Polish side nor the European institutions prioritised this aspect of 
the accession process (Baginski, 2007). However, the accession perspective 
was identified as one of the major factor of building up Poland’s development 
cooperation system. 
 
By accession the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Estonia all had a more or 
less detailed development policy. However, a country such as Slovenia had a 
strategy that was unrefined, in part due to its limited knowledge of Africa, with 
the country only having one African embassy in Cairo. It was also related to 
different priorities on the part of the Slovene Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
‘Compared to the ministry's previous organisation it is easy to note the new 
level of attention paid to security and human security issues, as well as 
humanitarian aid which may be attributed to the EU's identity in world affairs 
(in the case of humanitarian aid)’ (in Edwards, 2006). Since 2006 Slovenia 
has been concentrating on the coherence of its development policy but as 
they acknowledge they still have ‘some work ahead of them’ (Adanja, 2007).  
 
The importance of institutions is vital to maintain political will. Most Member 
States appear to be going down the road of creating a unit within the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. However, the situation can often be more complicated. In 
the Czech Republic for example the situation was that ‘Ten different ministries 
are involved in implementing the development cooperation with different 
methodology, philosophy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is only coordinating 
their work, which is sometimes “mission impossible” and not only due to the 
ministries different political backgrounds. ….……We would like to have a 
specialized agency. We need an institution which can hold tenders. The 
Ministry of Finance is extremely restrictive and is saying “no” to the 
development agency third year in a row. We keep trying’ (in Burac and Mrak, 
2007, p. 19).  
 
Capacity building in the bureaucracy is also important in CEE states. This 
capacity building has been aided by mentoring agreements. Some links have 
a geographical connection such as those between Austria and Slovakia. 
Other governments have opted to take a very active role in building capacity 
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in the NMS, such as the Irish (see O’Neill, 2005) and the Belgians (see 
Biesemans, 2007). However, this capacity building is often hampered by the 
rotation of posts common in the diplomatic service. This rotation can often 
result in a loss of institutional memory due to the small numbers of staff active 
in the field of development cooperation (see Biesemans, 2007). Another 
forum for sharing expertise is the OECD DAC, yet only four of the NMS are 
OECD members and none of these are represented on the DAC.  
 
Whilst many CEE states like to see themselves as ‘re-emerging donors’ 
(Grimm and Armer, 2005) it is clear that there are large start up costs 
associated. Policy compromises and competing priorities mean development 
often comes in low down the policy agenda. It is therefore apparent that for 
many CEE states, especially smaller ones, EU development policy is an ideal 
way to become involved in development assistance without having to create 
costly new institutions. The issues of coherence and complementarity 
associated with development policy also play a role (see CEC, 2006). It 
makes little sense for Lithuania, say, to try and play a significant role in Africa, 
a continent where it has little expertise. It makes more sense for them to be 
more active in those countries where they have a comparative advantage 
such as Belarus. Saying that, bilateral programmes are attractive as they 
allow Member States to ‘fly the flag’ on development aid and as a result are 
becoming more common. 
 
Role of NGOs 
Civil society has a critical role to play in development policy (see Lister and 
Carbone, 2006). Ironically the lack of political expertise in the area of 
development cooperation has resulted in a situation where many CEE 
governments are open and willing to listen to NGOs. The problem has been 
that these NGOs were mainly west European based. Non-Governmental 
Development Organisations (NGDO) face a number of problems in the NMS. 
Some of these stem from a lack of history and low public awareness. The 
biggest challenge is to build capacity and financial stability (Bedoya, 2005). 
Some governments, notably the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, have 
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recognised this and pledged financial support to NGOs that are bidding for 
EuropeAid funds (Bucar & Mrak, 2007, p. 26).  
One significant development here has been the creation of the Presidency 
Fund. The Presidency Fund was established with the support of the Irish and 
Dutch Governments, both of which held the Presidency of the European 
Union in 2004 at the time of the accession of the ten NMS to promote the 
engagement of their NGOs and other civil society actors in the EU’s 
development policy debates. The Presidency Fund strongly supports the 
activities of national NGDO platforms across the NMS and in all CEE states, 
with the exception of Bulgaria and Romania, these platforms have been 
created. However, in the past couple of years there have been ‘marked 
changes’, with a huge growth in the number of strong development-focused 
NGOs within many CEE states. In particular we have seen strong women’s 
organisations/ networks develop, including the KARAT coalition and WIDE.  
 
Internal EU Developments 
One very significant development has been the abolition of the Development 
Council in June 2002. All development matters are now dealt with by the 
General Affairs Council (Orbie, 2003, 414). This is said to increase the 
political direction of development policy (Bretherton and Vogler, 2006, p. 114). 
It is also argued that this will benefit NMS who don’t have expertise and large 
staff numbers in the field of development policy. The fact that the NMS equal 
25% of the votes in the Council means that those areas subject to QMV in 
development cooperation are likely to feel the influence of the NMS, although 
the lack of staff and expertise could diminish this influence (Morgera & Marin 
Duran, 2004; Van Reisen, 2007, p. 52). The expansion of the EU has also 
increased the voting power of the Union in international development 
institutions (Granell, 2005, p. 12). The Slovenian Presidency of early 2008 is 
likely to be a crucial one both in terms of judging the success of enlargement 
and for getting a better sense of priorities in the field of development.  
 
Enlargement puts pressure on the structure of the Commission, particularly 
the division of responsibilities between the external affairs and development 
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portfolios (see Dearden, 2003 for background). The impact on the 
Commission is not clear but according to one DfiD source: ‘It appears that the 
Commission is still coming to terms with managing its business in the face of 
enlargement.  It will look forward to being able to streamline itself through the 
establishment of a smaller number of Commissioners in the medium term and 
a full-time presidency, assuming the new Treaty gets through unscathed’. 
There is also the challenge identified by the DAC peer review of whether the 
EU has the capacity to manage some of the aid of the Member States, 
perhaps through co-financing or delegated cooperation. Therefore it will need 
to expand its vision further to ensure it plays a role in leading, encouraging, 
tracking and helping Member States. In the broader debate on the “added 
value” of the Community, this is a good example of the role that it can play 
(OECD, 2007, p. 37).  
 
Enlargement has also raised the whole question of whether the EDF should 
cease to be a separate fund, but should instead be ‘budgetised’, that is 
incorporated within the EU budget (Maxwell & Engel, 2003). For accession 
countries, budgetisation could reduce the total cost of participating in aid 
programmes. As Poul Nielson has remarked: 
‘Increasing development assistance will be quite a challenge for many of our 
new Member States. It would be unreasonable to expect the new members to 
go to 0.39% by 2006. The best advice I can give is for the new members to 
support budgetisation of the EDF. They would get credit for their contribution, 
influence the policy and access bidding on contracts’ (in Maxwell and Engel, 
2003). At present though it looks like any such moves have been vetoed, in 
particular by the UK.  
 
Potential Benefits of Enlargement on Development Policy 
Many commentators have argued that enlargement could have positive 
implications for development policy. The argument here is that is because of 
their history CEE states are well placed to advise states on how to manage 
both political and economic transitions. Specifically this is seen as offering 
lessons to future accession states in how to manage the transition from donor 
to recipient. As argued in an ODI report in 2003, ‘the challenge facing Europe 
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in the coming years will be to build on the history and experience of the 
accession countries, whilst simultaneously inducting them into the values and 
practices of their new partners’ (Maxwell and Engel, 2003). Indeed the 
European Consensus stated that ‘the EU will capitalise on new Member 
States' experience (such as transition management) and help strengthen the 
role of these countries as new donors’ (CEC, 2007). It goes on:  
‘Actually, at the operational level there is a lack of co-ordination and 
harmonisation between donors and a resistance to align along partner 
countries’ own development priorities, policies and systems. This results in 
reduced aid effectiveness duplication of efforts, inconsistency of approaches 
and burdening recipient countries with innumerable programming, monitoring 
and evaluation, implementation and auditing exercises. Alignment would be 
the best way to enhance effectiveness and thus reduce the transaction costs 
of aid delivery. The experience of the new Member States, as former 
beneficiaries of external aid, is useful in this regard’. It is clear that ‘a clear 
comparative advantage of NMS exists in the areas of transition expertise as 
well as EU accession expertise’ (Bucar and Mrak, 2007, p. 14). 
 
Yet, one could question the validity of this argument. The reason being that 
the EU has a unique tool for democratisation far more successful than other 
approaches, in that it makes the success of the domestic reform process in a 
country a prerequisite for joining the EU (Grossman, 2006). The fact that 
many Eastern European countries have become eligible for EU membership 
negotiations upon establishing a democratic tradition and respect for human 
rights, is a ‘carrot’ the EU has used very effectively and successfully to 
influence democracy development in its neighbouring countries (Grossman, 
2006). However, in the case of most developing countries this same ‘carrot’ 
cannot be offered, as they are not eligible as candidates for accession for 
geographical reasons. The context into which the democratic transition of 
CEE states is placed is thus very different from most developing countries in 
the world and it is therefore questionable how valuable their experiences 
would be to the democratic transition process of other developing countries at 
the very start of this transition. 
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Conclusion 
The 10 Member States from CEE that have joined the EU since 2004 have 
either doubled or have significantly increased their ODA since the accession 
and have demonstrated their commitment to the "acquis communautaire". As 
a result the ability of the new Member States to meet their commitments is 
evaluated very positively; they have agreed to individual baselines adapted to 
their specific situations. They have committed themselves to striving towards 
reaching the 'acquis' of the EU in 2002 (0.33% ODA/GNI) by 2015 through the 
gradual increase of their ODA, with an intermediate target of 0.17% by 2010. 
It appears that many of the concerns raised prior to enlargement were 
unfounded. Indeed Michaux argued that there were similar concerns raised 
during previous enlargements about the lack of a tradition of development 
cooperation in accession states, yet these fears also proved unfounded 
(Michaux, 2002, p. 19).  
 
CEE states bring a comparative advantage in specific geographical areas as 
well as policy sectors. They can also advise future Member States, notably 
Croatia, about the challenges of taking on the EU Development acquis. 
Having said that it is clear that much work still remains to be done, especially 
in the fields of ODA, the untying of aid, the focus on poverty reduction and 
building a constituency for development. Also there is a specific problem of 
the loss of an institutional memory on EU development policy within Foreign 
Affairs Ministries. Without expertise and without vocal NGOs maintaining the 
political the new Member States may find development issues slipping down 
the agenda.  
 
Rechliber argues that the ‘European Commission and the EU15 bear the 
responsibility for supporting the NMS in raising the quantity and quality of their 
development co-operation’. The complicated nature of both the administrative 
structure and financial instruments associated with EU Development policy do 
not make it easy for a new member state to get to grips with the demands of 
the acquis quickly. It is too early to tell but some signs exist that the NMS 
would not be opposed to a streamlining of EU activities in this field. Recent 
reforms have seen ECHO and EuropeAid take on specific functions, possibly 
 19
leaving room only for one DG responsible for development. This process 
would continue the trend of marginalising DG Development.  
 
One contribution to a debate on the future of EU development policy observed 
that the current situation cannot be described as a 27+1 but rather a 15+12+1. 
It highlights the need to find a common ground with the NMS on the revised 
Development Policy Statement (DG Devt, 2005). The vision was that as the 
NMS experience higher economic growth rates following accession to the 
Union their ODA would increase as a % of GDP. This has not happened as 
planned, with some states appearing to back track on pledges. The inclusion 
of Romania and Bulgaria into the EU further complicates the situation. 
However, in Romania many positives have been identified. A “National 
Strategy on Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid” and a budget 
for development cooperation were created in 2006. Romania has also not 
gone down the road of including debt cancellation in its ODA figures (Hayes, 
2007, p. 43), suggesting some lessons were learned from the 2004 
enlargement, although the situation in Bulgaria is less clear.  
 
What will take a while to become clear is exactly how the enlargement has 
affected relations with ACP states. Clearly CEE states are no longer a 
competitor for funds with ACP states (Morgera and Marin Duran, 2004, p. 
162) and 4.68% of the new states contribution to the EU will be allocated to 
development (Olsen, 2005, p. 605). However, the majority of new members 
do not have the same historic links with the ACP grouping as many within the 
EU-15 and their influence is likely to further continue the trend towards 
regional groupings and in particular the focus on LDCs countries, although 
none of the CEE states appears to question aid to Africa. What the new states 
wish to see is more conditionality, sharing as they do the concerns of old 
Member States about the importance of security, migration and trade in 
relations with the developing world. The new member states also wish to 
prioritise the near abroad. Clearly in a competitive aid market the former 
recipients of EU aid are going to play a crucial role in how that aid develops 
over the next decade.   
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